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

Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge

The Position of Muslim Migrants in the European Union: *Emancipation or Marginalisation?*

Jan Jaap de Ruiter
Associate Professor, Centre for Studies of Multilingualism in the Multicultural Society, Tilburg University

This article addresses the question of whether the Muslim migrant communities living in Europe form a destabilising risk to European societies, and whether there is a need to develop a European policy on Islam. A demographic, socio-economic, educational, juridical and political picture of the Muslim migrant communities is drawn. The article concludes that it is unrealistic to suggest that the Muslim migrant communities form a risk to European societies. On the contrary, the European countries and the European Union should formulate a socio-economic policy, not an Islamic one, in order to guarantee the emancipation of, amongst others, the Muslim migrants living in Europe. Finally, an intensive dialogue is needed between Europe and its Muslim citizens in order to remove the mutual stereotypes that have existed since the first contact between both civilisations.

Introduction

The Dutch professor Pim Fortuyn, an eloquent commentator in various periodicals and public debates, wrote a booklet in 1997 entitled[1] 'Against the islamisation of our culture: the Dutch identity as foundation'.[2] In this publication, Fortuyn agitated against the spreading influence of Islam in the Netherlands and advocated a retreat to the foundation of the Dutch identity. Interestingly, the Dutch language and culture are not known as being very stable. Dutch migrants abroad, in Australia and the United States for example, are known to give up their language relatively quickly. One year later Üzeyir Kabaktepe, chairman of the Turkish Milli Görüš Movement in the Netherlands stated: 'I do not complain about Holland. If I consider how the situation of Muslims is here or how their situation is in Turkey, then their situation here is much better'.[3]

Islam is a religion that has provoked a range of both negative and positive reactions in Europe. This situation persists as is shown in the daily newspapers. For instance, an article on the voting behaviour of Muslims in the Netherlands begins its analysis by asking 'Is the danger of Islam advancing in the Netherlands?'.[4] The mutual images stem from an old shared history of the Islamic world and Europe. Less than 80 years after the death of the prophet Mohammed

(632 AD), the Islamic armies crossed the strait of Gibraltar, *Jabal Tariq* (the mountain of Tariq) to Spain and France. From that moment on the two cultures met both as friends and as enemies. A friendly relationship existed during parts of the era of the Arab Islamic presence in Spanish Andalusia where Muslims, Christians and Jews lived together in tolerance and cultural prosperity. The Crusades form an example of tension, violence and psychological warfare between Christians and Muslims. From the first moment of contact to the present day, the reciprocal pre-conceptions and opinions have been, and still are, strongly influenced by misconceptions and superstition. The latest phase of Islamic presence in Europe is that of migrant workers from North Africa and Turkey, (although a very small number of Turkish migrants has a Christian background) and smaller groups with an Islamic country background. This renewed Islamic presence is often connected with the 'traditional' ideas of the Islamic threat to Europe, as the examples above show.

This article deals with the question of whether there is a basis for the assumption that this renewed presence of Islam forms a destabilising risk to European societies. The article will consequently also deal with whether the European Union (EU) and the individual European states should develop a policy towards Islam. A final question is whether the future Muslims in Europe will face will be one of emancipation or of marginalisation. In order to answer these questions, the reader will be informed on Islamic communities in Europe by means of demographic statistics and a description of the socio-economic, educational, juridical and political status of these groups. The term 'Muslim' is elucidated followed by a description of the internal structure of Muslim communities in Europe. The relations between the Muslim communities and European countries are subsequently referred to. In the last section the discussion will be summarised and a number of conclusions will be presented.

Background

Demographic statistics

The latest phase in the Islamic presence in Europe is that of massive labour migration from North Africa and Turkey to western European countries. This labour migration was supposed to have a temporary character, but soon became permanent when family reunions took place and children were born in Europe. It is difficult to procure a 'hard' figure of the number of Muslims living in Europe, as Muslims are generally not registered as Muslims. For example, in Denmark it is even forbidden to be registered on the basis of religion.[5] Sizeable Muslim minorities, such as ethnic Turks and Pomaks live in Greece, but they are not regarded as migrants as they are indigenous groups.

Statistics based on nationality suffer from erosion due to the high rate of naturalisation. The degree of naturalisation is particularly high in the Netherlands for instance: the figure for 1995 was 71,445. In France, for the same year the figure was 92,410, compared to 31,797 in Germany and 4,056 in Britain. Furthermore, in Britain, 80% of Muslims originate from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Most of

these obtained British citizenship under British colonial laws and thus, of the whole British Muslim community more than 50% have British nationality. In France too, the percentage of Muslim holders of French passports approaches 50%.[6] Nonneman *et al* describe the Muslim communities in western and eastern European countries.[7] Each of the chapters in Nonneman *et al.* presents figures on the size of the communities. The following table summarises these figures as well as the total numbers of inhabitants of the various western European countries.[8]

Table 1: Estimated numbers of Muslims, total population in European countries and proportion of Muslims in per cent of total population (source: Nonneman et al, and OECD Economic Surveys, 1998, 1999).

Country	*Total population*	*Estimated number of Muslims*	*Proportion (in %)*
United Kingdom	58,782,000	1,000,000	1.7%
Belgium	10,157,000	236,077	2.3%
The Netherlands	15,494,000	405,900	2.6%
France	58,380,000	1,750,000 to 4,000,000	3.0% to 6.8%
Germany	81,877,000	2,500,000	3.0%
Sweden	8,901,000	200,000	2.2%
Denmark	5,262,000	50,000 to 75,000	0.9% to 1.4%
Spain	39,270,000	111,000 to 175,000	0.3% to 0.4%
Italy	57,473,000	500,000	0.9%
Total	335,596,000	6,752,977 to 9,091,977	2.0% to 2.7%

The figures for France show enormous variation. The two figures relate to 'an externally-imposed identity (i.e., the high figure) and a self-proclaimed one' (i.e., the low figure[9]). Broeder and Extra mention figures for the Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) and Turkey based on the statistics of the European Union in the following table.[10]

Table 2: Numbers of Maghrebis and Turks in European countries (source: EuroStat Yearbook, 1997, in Broeder and Extra.

Country	*Maghreb*	*Turkey*
Belgium	161,588	88,302
Denmark	3,952	34,658
Germany	133,945	1,918,395
Greece	827	3,066
Spain	64,940	301
France	1,393,165	197,712
Italy	115,675	3,656
The Netherlands	167,887	202,618
Portugal	302	65
Finland	910	995
Sweden	3,284	23,649
United Kingdom	7,000	41,000
Total	2,053,475	2,514,417

The Broeder and Extra data are based on the nationality criterion. If we assume an Islamic background of migrants, irrespective of nationality, then the numbers could be higher. Given these statistics, it seems reasonable to say that there are around nine million Muslims living in Europe, of which around four and a half million are from the Maghreb and Turkey. Of the total population of the countries mentioned in Table 1, the percentage of Muslims in the European Union is 2.7%.

Socio-economic status

The Maghreb and Turkish communities nowadays consist mainly of families. The men arrived in the 1960s and 1970s on an individual basis as contract workers, whereas now, full communities consisting of a first, second and third generation have come into being. Initially, the men started working in the lower labour tiers and were over-represented in the low wage jobs. This situation has hardly changed. Nevertheless, Moroccans, Turks and Algerians have started to filter modestly into higher jobs and positions in governmental services.

The unemployment that struck Europe, especially in the beginning of the 1990s, hit migrant labourers particularly hard: the unemployment rates are in general much higher than among the 'indigenous' population which vary from 21% in Spain to 5.1% in the Netherlands. In France, the unemployment figures are in general twice as high among the migrants as among the indigenous population,[11] and it has also been reported that 'in Britain's big cities nearly half of the Islamic youth are unemployed'.[12]

Educational status

The first generation migrants from Turkey and the Maghreb show a multifarious educational palette. Labourers that came from Morocco were in general very poorly educated. Mehlem mentions a rate of 69% illiteracy in first generation Moroccan labourers that came to Germany.[13] Among the Algerian population that came to France, it is recorded that '75% des femmes venues d'Algérie avant 1965 après l'âge de 15 ans n'ont pas été scolarisés contre 54% des hommes'.[14] Turks on the other hand were in general better educated than the Moroccans that came to Europe. Nevertheless, amongst the children of migrants from North Africa and Turkey one still sees an under-representation in the higher levels of education and an over-representation in the lower levels of education. Although, for instance, in a country like France, Moroccans of the second and third generation have started to filter through to higher forms of education in a more substantial way.[15]

In a large-scale inventory of studies on underachievement of minorities living in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium and Britain, Fase reached the following conclusion. Second generation Moroccans and Turks living in the Netherlands, Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians living in France, West-Indians and Bangladeshi living in Britain, and Turks living in Germany and Belgium should be considered *unsuccessful* in education.[16] On the other hand Indonesians, Spaniards and Italians living in the Netherlands, Indians, Pakistanis and Greeks living in Britain, Greeks and Spaniards in Germany and Greeks and Portuguese in Belgium could be considered *successful* in education. In his analysis of the studies mentioned, Fase suggested three main causes for these developments: adaptation, social class, and ethnic stratification. The most important factor seems to be the social class that minorities belong to.

Juridical and political status

There exists a striking difference between migrants who still keep only their country of origin nationality, and migrants who have adopted the nationality of their host country. As we have seen above, most immigrant holders of European passports are in a minority position in their respective countries, with the exception of Britain. Muslim holders of European passports have all the juridical and political rights that the indigenous Europeans have: they have the right to vote and to stand for office. The majority of the European Muslims, however, are not allowed to vote in any elections. There is a growing tendency to grant migrants who are non-holders of European passports but who fulfil certain conditions (such as having lived in the country in question for at least five years), the right to participate in municipal elections. This is already the case in the Netherlands and in Denmark whereas Germany is only beginning to give migrant groups the right to vote and to stand for office. This process is connected to the debate on facilitating the procedure for migrants to obtain German nationality. In Britain it is reported that 'Muslims wield considerable political influence, especially at the municipal level'.[17] The French parliament started a debate on the participation of

non-European residents in municipal elections but has not yet issued any legislation in this area.[18] In general, it can be concluded that most European Muslim migrants have no direct influence on decision-makers within the European Union.

This does not mean, however, that Muslim migrants are not represented in the various administrative and political bodies. Muslim representatives of North African and Turkish origin can be found in a number of European parliaments. In this respect, it is interesting to see that three members of the Dutch Parliament are of Moroccan origin, one representing the Green Left party, one the Liberals and one the Labour Party. The German parliament also has a Socialist and a Green representative of Turkish background. Interestingly, it is not necessarily the case that Muslim representatives want to exclusively represent the ethnic group they come from. They consider themselves to be elected by and represent their 'entire' constituency, a position one naturally expects from every member of parliament, irrespective of background.

On the other hand, it is clear that they are the persons to contact in the case of political issues affecting Islamic communities. For example, this was the case with Baroness Uddin, one of two Muslim members of the British House of Lords who commented on the first meeting of the British Muslim Council with Home Office Minister Straw.[19] The interest in establishing Islamic political parties is remarkably low in the European Union. The Islamic Party of Great Britain, for instance, does not gain much support in elections. Most Muslim migrants who have the right to vote, generally tend to vote for existing political parties. In the Netherlands, Muslim voters have a preference for left wing parties. It is particularly interesting to note that the Dutch Christian Democratic Party tries to appeal to Muslim voters on a supposedly common religious and ethic basis. However, this policy has not proved to be very successful. In the case of Britain, most Muslims vote Labour because the Conservative party is not considered to be very migrant-friendly.

Muslim migrants in the European Union

The term 'Muslim'

The use of the term Muslim in reference to economic migrants from Turkey and Northern Africa is not found often in the literature and in governmental documents. They are in general referred to as 'guest labourers', 'Turks', 'Moroccans', 'migrants', 'new citizens' and so on. Neither do migrants themselves seem to refer to themselves as Muslims in the first place. When asked, they tend to refer to themselves as labourers or as Turks, Moroccans, or Algerians. The issue of religious self-reference is another question posed by Nonneman *et al*: 'How important are religious elements when compared to linguistic and ethnic elements?'[20]

It seems that the latter two are regarded by the Muslim migrants as more meaningful. An illustration of this comes from Italy where Italian Muslims regard

themselves predominantly as migrants rather than as Muslims.[21] Étienne stated that young people in France of Maghrebi, Sub-Saharan African or Turkish origin 'are not Muslims but are stigmatised as such'.[22] Nielsen also remarked that migrants look at their respective countries of origin as cultural points of reference only.[23] Research shows that the socio-cultural orientation of first and second generation migrants from Turkey and Morocco is still partially aimed towards the *countries* of origin.[24]

Internal structure of the Muslim community

The term 'Muslim community' is misleading in the sense that it gives the impression that Muslims in Europe form a homogeneous group. This is not the case since religious groups and ethnic and national backgrounds further divide the European Islamic communities. Where they are established, mosques follow general ethnic or national affiliations. There are mosques for Pakistanis, Turks, Moroccans and other national groups. Diverse streams of Islam can also be found. The majority is Sunni but there are small Shici groups and Alevites as well. In the various European countries, unity is not a *sine qua non*. Vicén Del Olmo stated that Muslims in Spain show a low level of solidarity.[25] Sunier & Meyer also claimed that 'as a result of Islam's rather decentralised structure in Germany [...], it is difficult for it to satisfy the requirement of representing an entire religious community'.[26] To illustrate this, it was only during the second Gulf War in 1991 that Dutch Muslims succeeded to speak with a single voice to the Dutch government. This mouthpiece soon collapsed due to internal disagreement and currently Muslims in the Netherlands are represented by three organisations due to 'ethnic disunity, personal rivalry, differences in size, capability of organising themselves and an orientation to the country of origin'.[27]

The fact that the Muslim community cannot be depicted as a homogeneous entity in the European Union does not mean that there is a lack of organisations and associations which cooperate to a certain extent. In the Netherlands, for example, in the region of Northern Brabant, 82 Islamic organisations were noted in 1992. Most of them were established by Turks, a minority by Moroccans, and a few by Surinamese and Moluccans, 28 Mosques are set up in all European Union countries, there are Islamic schools in the Netherlands and Denmark, and cultural associations like those that aim at reviving Berber and Kurdish cultures throughout Europe. In Hamburg, 24% of all Turkish children attend Koran courses.[29] The United Kingdom has at least two 'national Muslim' organisations like the Islamic Council of Europe and the Unions of Muslim Organisations in the United Kingdom and Eire.[30]

The influence of the countries of domicile is also noticeable. Organisations of Turks in Germany are often connected to the Religious Affairs Department of the Prime Minister's Office. The Islamic Association of the Netherlands (HDV), supervises 150 mosques throughout the Netherlands. This Diyanet falls under the direct responsibility of the Turkish Prime Minister. It is remarkable that the Turkish chairman of the HDV was not in favour of the establishment of a Dutch programme for the formation of imams in the Netherlands, using the argument

that the quality of the Turkish organisation has proven itself well enough. The positive argument of an education in Europe contributing to the emancipation of the Turks was thus not appreciated.[31]

In Belgium, Islam has been a recognised religion since 1974. This recognition implies that Muslim Community in Belgium, through a commission instituted by law or royal degree, has the right to a series of mainly financial advantages. The recognition of Islam is related to the government's organisation of the election of a National Council of Representatives for Muslims in 1998 where 70,000 'Muslim' voters were registered for this election. The Council is, among other things, organised on an ethnic basis, which was the cause of extensive debate and resistance. The Belgian government's reason for organising this Council seems to be negatively motivated: its fear of Muslim fundamentalism. Nevertheless, Belgium thus sets an example of government-driven unification of Muslims.[32]

Islam in the European Union

Since the first contact between 'Christian' Europe and Islam, relations have suffered from prejudices. Both sides, Christian and Muslim, seem to 'refuse' to call each other by their 'proper' names. Muslims call Christians 'Nasranis' (the followers of the man from Nazareth) and 'Rums' (related to the Romans), while Christians call Muslims 'Mohammedans'[33], although Muslims do not regard themselves as followers of the prophet Mohammed in the way Christians regard themselves as followers of Christ. One cause of the generally distorted images may be that both religions claim universality. Both have a so-called universal truth that in essence does not tolerate another universal truth.

Nevertheless, history shows that Muslims have shown themselves to be generally more tolerant than Christians where in Spain for instance, both Jews and Muslims were expelled in 1492. The first mention of Islam in the study by Samuel Huntington on the *Clash of Civilisations*, is negative: 'Islam is exploding demographically with destabilising consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbours'.[34] This seems to imply that nothing good can be expected from the 'growth of the Islamic population'. Huntington labels the civilisation of the peoples that have Islam as their principle religion as the 'Islamic civilisation'. At the same time, he does not speak of 'Christian' civilisation, but of 'western', 'Latin American' and, yes, 'orthodox' civilisations. At the same time, a different voice reflects the following quote of Wasif Shadid: 'il n'y a pas d'aspects importants dans l'islam moderne qui entravent l'intégration des musulmans dans une société non-islamique'.[35]

The negative mutual images have a long history. With the renewed Islamic presence of Muslims in Europe, one just has to open a newspaper to find old beliefs revived. This is for example, the case in Denmark where, in a worsening socio-economic context in the nineties, Muslims were generally blamed for the economic crisis. It is remarkable to see that other minorities living in Europe are not similar targets of such extreme attitude. Buddhists, Hindus or supporters of other religions are rarely attacked the way Muslims are in Europe.

The presence of approximately nine million Muslims, thus, seems to imply the

revival of old fallacies and misconceptions. One of these is the idea that Islam poses a threat to the European system of democracy. The train of thought is that in Islam there is no distinction between church and state and therefore, Islam would prefer to see a combination of these two in Europe as well. In contrast, European democracies are examples of the separation between church and state. England has a state church, of which the Queen is the head, but this does not imply that the English church and state are one and the same body. The idea of a combined church and state is not unnatural since it lies in the birth and early history of Islam. Lewis stressed that Islam originated while an empire was being built. This was not the case with the birth of Christianity, which grew up while the Roman empire was breaking down. A look at the history of Islam shows that this inseparable church and state structure was not always applied nor pursued. There are numerous instances of a distinction between *din* (religion) and *dawla* (state). Lewis also explained that the ideal of the religious *umma* (community) is hardly realised in the history of Islam. According to him modern pan-Islamism is a phase passed like in South America the various states passed the phases of unity.[36] At present, the Muslim world is divided into states to which the civilians feel attached and which indicate no signs of disintegration. Furthermore, as was already mentioned above, Muslims in Europe feel strongly connected to their home countries but not necessarily to the Islamic *umma*.

Democracy is important to Muslims in Europe, too. To a much greater extent than in their home countries, Muslims of North Africa and Turkey are able to experience and express cultural and religious feelings they never could or can in their home countries. There are numerous Berber and Kurdish associations devoted to Berber and Kurdish culture, music, literature and poetry. Some of the young Muslims are rediscovering their religion, but in multifarious, independent ways. The overwhelming majority of Islamic organisations in Europe stick to the democratic internal rules, have their crises, are liquidated and then re-established like any other organisation in Europe. Only those associations or organisations that, like certain European right wing organisations, call for absolute power and the liquidation or expulsion of other ethnic or religious groups, should be banned from the political arena, as was the case in November 1998, when the Dutch extreme right-wing party CP'86 was banned. The negative statement often heard is that the democratic liberties Muslims enjoy will permit them to take advantage and to exploit them in order to 'take power' in Europe. But would a Muslim, who is not able to live a certain religious or cultural lifestyle in his home country, act this way? Would he not value liberty and democracy in Europe and take care not to spoil it? In this context, the quote at the beginning of this article by Üzeyir Kabaktepe, chairman of the Milli Görüš in the Netherlands, is significant. From a totally different source a similar statement is illustrative of European Muslims' attachment to democracy: 'I have all faith in the third and fourth generation (Moroccans). These people have lots of skills and want to do something with their lives. After all, that is why they came to the Netherlands' says 26-year-old Rachid Lamsarouad, an outed Moroccan gay activist referring to his fellow generation members.[37]

One should also take into consideration that there is an increasing secularisation within the Turkish and Maghrebi communities in Europe. Even though religious leaders in Europe warn of the increasing secularisation of youth, it is estimated that only 20% of the Muslims in the Netherlands still maintain their necessary religious duties[38]. It is to be expected that this process of secularisation will continue, while at the same time, a subgroup of young Muslims will relive the religion of Islam.

Another issue relates to the social-emotional state of most migrants. At a certain point after having lived a number of years in their new country, working, going to school, raising families, they discover, when visiting their countries of origin, that they are no longer the same person as when they left their *watan* (homeland). They have changed, and they measure this change by the reaction of their friends and family they left behind. They have become more European than they realised during their stay in Europe. This state of mind applies to second generation children in particular who see their roots become more and more European.

A final issue concerns Muslim fundamentalism. Fundamentalism condoning violence and advocating the absolute power of Islam can be found in countries like Algeria, where a harsh battle is being fought by the fundamentalists. In most Arab countries, however, fundamentalism is not or is only marginally accepted by the governments, as we can see from the repression of fundamentalist movements in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. Terrorism caused by whatever religious or other ideological movement should also be opposed, as is the case in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, 'traditional' European areas of religious and ethnic conflict. In this respect the remarks of Gilles Kepel, on post-Islamism, are interesting.[39] In his view, Islamic fundamentalism has been considerably weakened by the extreme violence used in Arab societies. Therefore, he concluded that 'pour l'instant ce sont les 'pragmatiques' qui ont le vent en poupe [...]' and 'personne ne pose trop de questions sur le passé récent, à condition que l'on soit disponible pour une sorte de pacte social nouveau à définir' implying that Muslims in the Arab countries will cooperate with all sectors in society to reach justice and fair distribution of prosperity.

Conclusion

Does the renewed presence of Islam pose a destabilising risk to European societies? The renewed presence of Islam in Europe is manifested in the wave of migrants labourers and their families from Turkey and North Africa. The description of the socio-economic, educational, juridical, and political status of these migrants indicates that, in all these domains, they occupy a disadvantaged position. The rate of unemployment in these groups is significantly higher than among the indigenous population. Their educational under-achievement is striking, primarily due to social factors and because their political organisational structures are weak. Furthermore, Islamic communities in Europe are internally divided. The bearers of Islam in Europe do not form a homogeneous socio-economic and politically powerful enough group that can influence decision-making in diverse societies. Muslim migrants and their children are in the process of trying to advance in society

in order to obtain better positions in all fields. In doing so they are following the same democratic rules to an extent equal to that of indigenous European citizens.

Therefore, it cannot be said that Islam in itself forms a destabilising risk to European societies. Nor is it necessary to develop an Islamic policy, at either the level of the European nation-state, or the European Union level of governance. What is necessary is an all-encompassing socio-economic policy in the national states and the European Union to improve the socio-economic, educational and juridical status of all those who are disadvantaged. The target citizens of such a policy are not Islamic communities exclusively. The policy would also be aimed towards underdeveloped areas in the Community and lower indigenous socio-economic groups. The religious label in this context is superfluous. Does this mean that a discussion with Europeans with an Islamic background is not necessary? On the contrary, it is greatly needed. The mutually unrealistic pre-conceptions of Islam and Christianity are still very much present. It is these images that form a threat to the internal European-Islamic relations. We see too often that Islam is connected to a negative image. In periods of economic depression, the traditionally imaginary enemies are conjured up, which could have a destabilising effect on European societies.

A socio-economic policy and an open dialogue are what may produce the emancipation of Muslim communities in Europe and prevent their marginalisation. Muslim migrants in Europe have made significant contributions to building Europe. Their presence today, their languages, cultures and religion, feeds the multicultural character of Europe. It is a high aspiration to make sure that each civilian can enjoy his or her language, culture and religion in a free democratic atmosphere. It takes a strong socio-economic policy of emancipation and an open dialogue including European Muslims for them to participate in such a society as well.

1 All translations of the various non-English, i.e. Dutch, quotes and titles into English are from the author.

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3 'Geloof in het tijdperk van de rede', *NRC Handelsblad*, 17-12-1998.

4 'Islamieten kiezen voor bestaande politieke partij', *Utrechts Nieuwsblad*, 7-4-1999.

5 Cf. J. Hjarnø, 'Muslims in Denmark', in G. Nonneman, T. Niblock & B. Szajkowski, eds., *Muslim communities in the new Europe*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1997, pp. 291-302.

6 Cf. EuroStat, *EuroStat Yearbook 1997*, Luxembourg, EuroStat, 1997, pp. 89-90. Other figures: Belgium 26,149; Denmark 5,260; Greece 3,717; Spain 6,756; Italy 7,442. Naturalisations in percentages of number of foreigners: Belgium 3%; Denmark 3%; Germany 0%; Greece 2%; Spain 1%; France 3%; Italy 1%, The Netherlands 9%; Britain 0%. For Britain cf. S. Vertovec, 'Muslims, the state, and the public sphere in Britain', in G. Nonneman *et al.*, *Muslim communities in the new Europe*, pp. 169-186; J.S. Nielsen, *Religion and citizenship in Europe and the Arab world*, London, Grey Seal, 1992; For France: Cf. Th. Sunier and A. Meyer, 'Religion', in H. Vermeulen, ed., *Immigrant policy for a multicultural society. A comparative study of integration, language and religious policy in five Western European countries*, Brussels, Migration Policy Group, 1997, pp. 101-129.

7 G. Nonneman *et al.*, *Muslim communities in the new Europe*.

8 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Economic Surveys 1998*, United Kingdom/The Netherlands/Germany/Sweden/Spain, Paris, OECD Publications, 1998; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Economic Surveys 1999*, Belgium/France/Denmark/Italy, Paris, OECD Publications, 1999.

9 Cf. J. House, 'Muslim communities in France', in G. Nonneman *et al.*, *Muslim communities in the new Europe*, pp. 219-239 and p. 221. See also below.

10 Cf. Peter Broeder and Guus Extra, *Language, ethnicity and education. Case studies of immigrant minority groups and immigrant minority languages*, Clevedon, Multilingual Matters, 1999; *EuroStat Yearbook 1997*.

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13 Ulrich Mehlem, Zweisprachigkeit marokkanischer Kinder in Deutschland, in *Europäische Hochschulschriften*, volume XXI, part 196, Frankfurt an Main, Peter Lang Verlag, 1998.

14 Michèle Tribalat, *Faire France. Une enquête sur les immigrés et leurs enfants*, Paris, La Découverte, 1995, p. 138.

15 Cf. C. Barthon, 'Elèves marocains et système scolaire français', in K. Basfao and H. Taarji, eds., *L'Annuaire de l'émigration Maroc*, Rabat, Ministère des Marocains à l'étranger, 1994, pp. 314-318.

16 Willem Fase, *Ethnic division in Western European Education*, Münster/New York, Waxmann Studies, 1994.

17 Cf. Sunier and Meyer, 'Religion', p. 119.

18 'La revendication du vote des étrangers rencontre un écho croissant dans la majorité', *Le Monde*, 25 November 1999.

19 'Britse moslims eisen bescherming', *Trouw*, 4-1-1999.

20 Nonnemann *et al.*, *Muslim Communities in the New Europe*, p. 4.

21 S. Allievi, 'The Muslim community in Italy, in G. Nonneman *et al.*, *Muslim communities in the new Europe*, p. 321.

22 B. Étienne, *La France et l'Islam*, Paris, Hachette, 1989, in House, 'Muslim communities in France', p. 221.

23 J.S. Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1995, p. 154.

24 Cf. Rian Aarts, Jan Jaap de Ruiter and Ludo Verhoeven, 'Tweetaligheid en schoolsuccess, *Studies in Meertaligheid*, vol. 4, Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1993.

25 Vicén Del Olmo, 'The Muslim community in Spain', in G. Nonneman *et al.*, *Muslim communities in the new Europe*, pp. 303-314.

26 Cf. Sunier and Meyer, 'Religion', p. 108.

27 Landman as quoted in 'Islamieten kiezen voor een bepaalde partij', *Utrechts Nieuwsblad*, 4-7-1999.

28 Hassan Yar, *Ongekende kansen. Een onderzoek naar kansen voor het maatschappelijk activeringswerk voor en door moslims in Noord-Brabant*, 1994, Tilburg, Prisma.

29 Y. Karakacoglu and G. Nonneman, 'Muslims in Germany, with special reference to the Turkish-Islamic community', in G. Nonneman *et al.*, *Muslim communities in the new Europe*, p. 254.

30 Cf. J.S. Nielsen, *Religion and citizenship in Europe and the Arab world*, 1992, p. 86.

31 'Moslimleider: De vraag past niet in het interview', *Trouw*, 12-12-1998.

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

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